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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Consider the classic mechanism design problem of providing a public good. In this problem,
the designer wants to choose how much of a public good to provide without knowing the
private valuations of the beneficiaries of the public good, i.e. the players. Depending on
the specifics of the problem, a mechanism usually exists such that players have incentives to
truthfully reveal their true valuations to the designer, so that the designer can then choose the
optimal quantity of the public good to provide the players with. In the classic mechanism
design literature, such mechanism relies on the ability of players to behave rationally, i.e.
players reveal their true valuations because that is how they maximize their payoffs given
their belief that all other players are rational and truthful.
However, in many real life situations players may not behave fully rational. This may
be for a variety of reasons, like computational constraints or memory limitations. If it can
be the case that players are not rational, the designer may want to have a measure on how
such irrationalities could affect the alternatives implemented by a certain mechanism. The
purpose of this paper is to study how are the outcomes of the mechanism design problem
affected when players are not fully rational.
We model bounded rationality by assuming that if a mechanism is in place such that
players have incentives to truthfully reveal their types when all other players reveal their
types (a mechanism that is incentive compatible), players may misrepresent their types. For
instance, in a public good problem a player may report a valuation that is lower than his
true valuation even if the mechanism in place is incentive compatible and he believes that all
other players will be truthful. There are several reasons why a player may misreport his true
type. It could be that he mistakenly thinks that he can “game the system” by reporting a
different type, or that he simply does not fully know what his own type is.
The way players misreport their types borrows from the ideas of robust control (see, for
instance, Zhou et al (1995)). We assume that for any given mechanism players behave in a
rational way as if their types were somewhere in a δ-neighborhood with δ > 0 of their true
types. This captures the idea that the designer may be missing important information on
how players behave because of their limited rationality. The designer would like to know how
the alternatives implemented by each mechanism are affected by these δ-perturbations. To
this end, the designer is endowed with a loss function that evaluates the differences between
any two alternatives given the true types of players.
Within this context, we say that a social choice function is k-robust if the maximum loss
when players misreport their types is of order δk with k ≥ 1. Evidently, higher k means that
the social choice function is more robust to the δ-perturbations, as the loss vanishes quickly
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when the size of the perturbation δ becomes small. In this paper we characterize the social
choice functions that are k-robust, and obtain three main results:
First, we find that how robust a social choice function is is linked to the concept of Ho¨lder
continuity, which is a generalization of Lipschitz continuity. Not surprisingly, a robust social
choice function is one where the alternatives implemented do not change dramatically when
the types of players are misreported slightly. This idea of continuity is translated in terms
of Ho¨lder continuity. The usefulness of this result lies in the fact that for understanding
how robust a certain social choice function is one simply has to explore its degree of Ho¨lder
continuity.
Second, we find that the only social choice functions that exhibit maximum robustness
to perturbations (∞-robust social choice functions) are those that are locally constant, i.e.
the alternative implemented by the social choice function is constant in the neighborhood
of players’ true types. There are several examples of settings where the designer may use a
locally constant social choice function, from auctions to school choice problems. In all these
settings the irrationality of players modeled as δ-perturbations of their reported type does not
have any impact on the alternatives implemented by a mechanism. We show the applicability
of our second result with an auction example.
Third, we find that in quasi-linear utilitarian environments, i.e. environments where the
role of the designer is to maximize the sum of the (quasi-linear) utility of players and where
the loss function is given by the differences in sums of utilities, all social choice functions
are 2-robust. This means that the maximum loss caused by the δ-perturbations is of order
δ2. There are abundant examples of quasi-linear utilitarian environments in the mechanism
design literature; we illustrate the usefulness of this result by means of the public good
example in Bergemann and Morris (2009).
This paper combines two strands of literature. On the one hand it contributes to the
analysis of robust mechanism design problems. Previous literature has looked at robust
mechanism design from the perspective of the knowledge players have about the type space
(Bergemann and Morris (2005)), the relationship between dominant strategies and imple-
mentation (Bergemann and Morris (2009) and Yamashita (2012)) and the designers’ use of
almost optimal social choice functions (Meyer-ter-Vehn and Morris (2011)). Other papers
that have looked at the issue of robustness in mechanism design focus on the phenomenon
of bounded rationally with adaptive players (see, for instance, Cabrales (1999) or Mathevet
(2010)) or with “faulty” players (see Eliaz (2002)). Our paper differs from this strand of
literature in that we look at the problem of robust mechanism design from a different angle;
we study robust mechanism design using the concepts of robust control (Zhou et al (1995)).
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Our paper also contributes to the strand of literature that applies the framework of robust
control to economic problems. To our knowledge this literature has its roots in the work of
Peters Hansen and Thomas Sargent (see Hansen and Sargent (2001), Hansen and Sargent
(2007) or Williams (2008) for an overview). In contrast to these authors, we focus our efforts
on mechanism design problems as opposed to macroeconomic policy problems.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model while we present
our main results in Section 3. In Section 4 we present some examples that show the applica-
bility of our results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
An environment is a tuple (N,X,Θ, u, P ) where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, X is the
set of alternatives, Θ = {Θ1, . . . ,Θn} where Θi is the set of possible types of player i ∈ N ,
and u = (u1, . . . , un) where ui : X × Θi → R is the utility function of player i ∈ N . The
function P : Θ → [0, 1] is a probability measure on Θ and represents the common prior on
the distribution of types: P (θ) is the probability that players’ types are given by θ ∈ Θ. Each
player knows his own type and player i of type θi ∈ Θi holds a probabilistic belief P (θ−i|θi)
over the types of other players θ−i ∈ Θ−i = ×j∈N{i}Θj .
A social choice function f : Θ → X associates with each profile of types θ ∈ Θ an
alternative f(θ) ∈ X. Given a profile of types θ, a loss function lθ : X × X → R+ is a
mapping from a pair of alternatives to the positive reals with lθ(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ X and
lθ(x, y) = lθ(y, x) ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ X. In mathematical terms, {lθ}θ∈Θ is a collection of
metrics on X where the properties of sub-additivity and the identity of indiscernibles need
not be satisfied.
A mechanism is a pair (M, g) with M = ×i∈NMi where Mi is player’s i set of messages
and g : ×i∈NMi → X is the allocation rule. An environment together with a mechanism
(M, g) induce a Bayesian game G(M,g). A strategy profile s is given by s = ×i∈Nsi where si
is the strategy of player i and it is given by si : Θi →Mi.
Let s∗(θ) be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium ofG(M,g) when players’ types are given by θ ∈ Θ.
The profile of strategies s∗(θ) summarizes the players’ behavior that the designer considers
as salient. Acknowledging that players may not be fully rational in several dimensions,
the designer conjectures that each player chooses a strategy missrepreseting his type. In
particular, the designer believes that players’ strategies belong to the set s∗(Bδ(θ)) where
Bδ(θ) ⊂ Θ is the ball of radius δ > 0 around θ given some metric d. That is, according to
the designer, players behave as if their types where in a δ-neighborhood of their true types.
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This is how the designer acknowledges that players may not be fully rational. Players are
not aware of these perturbations, they simply choose a strategy in s∗(Bδ(θ)).
Note that this paper uses mainly two sets of metrics: one set is singleton and given by
the metric d on Θ and another set is given by the metrics {lθ}θ∈Θ on X. The former set
of metrics is meant to specify how distances in players types are measured while the latter
set of metrics specifies how differences in alternatives are evaluated by the designer. Both of
these two sets of metrics are given exogenously.
An obvious alternative to the way we model players’ bounded rationality is to assume
that the strategies players choose lie in Bδ(s
∗(θ)), i.e. players choose their strategies in the
δ-neighborhood of the equilibrium strategies. Such representation of limited rationality has
several conceptual problems that arise from the fact that the designer is the one that chooses
the mechanism (M, g). Given that the designer is the one that chooses (M, g), he is in effect
choosing the space of messages M and also its metric. Hence, the designer is indirectly
choosing the set Bδ(s
∗(θ)) and, thus, he can choose a metric such that Bδ(s
∗(θ)) = s∗(θ)
(which can be achieved with the discrete metric, for instance). This would mean that in
effect the designer is eliminating his acknowledgment of the limited rationality of players.
Given that we want to model the designers’ problem when he accepts that players may be
not be fully rational, he should not be allowed to ignore the inherent uncertainty that comes
from such bounded rationality. In our definition of how the designer introduces the possibility
of not fully rational players, the designer believes that players choose strategies as if their
types where somewhere in Bδ(θ), which is a set that follows from the set of players’ types Θ
and its metric d, both of which are given exogenously.
If players follow strategies s in the game G(M,g) and the social choice function is f , the
maximum loss for a given θ ∈ Θ and δ > 0 is given by maxθ′∈Bδ(θ) lθ(g(s(θ
′)), f(θ)). Classical
mechanism design sets δ = 0 (i.e. Bδ(θ) = θ) and requires that there exists a mechanism
(M, g) and an equilibrium s∗(θ) of G(M,g) such that g(s
∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, i. e.
maximum loss is zero.
We are now ready to introduce the measure of robustness used in this paper:
Definition 1. A social choice function f is k-robustly implementable (or simply k-robust) if
there exists a mechanism (M, g) such that:
(i) The mechanism (M, g) implements f in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium: for all θ ∈ Θ
there exists a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium s∗(θ) of G(M,g) such that g(s
∗(θ)) = f(θ).
(ii) The mechanism (M, g) bounds the maximum loss by a factor of δk: for all θ ∈ Θ there
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exist a c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ),
lθ
(
g(s∗(θ′)), f(θ)
)
< cδk
with k ≥ 1.
Requirement (i) of Definition 1 requires f to be implementable in the classical sense, and
it implies that the social choice function is Bayesian incentive compatible: for each player i
and for each type θi we have that∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)dP (θ−i|θi) ≥
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi)dP (θ−i|θi),
for all θ′i ∈ Θi. In particular, truth-telling is an equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism
(Θ, f).
Requirement (ii) states that if a social choice function is k-robust then the loss due to the
bounded rationality of players cannot be of a factor greater than δk. Note that effectively
the designer is following a maxmin approach. In particular, k-robustnes implies that
max
θ′∈Bδ(θ)
lθ
(
g(s∗(θ′)), f(θ)
)
< cδk,
and the designer would like to know what is the minimum δk (maximum k) such the inequality
above is true. The maxmin approach is in line with previous economic models using the robust
control framework (see Hansen and Sargent (2001) and the reference to Gilboa and David
Schmeidler (1989) herein).
Given that the purpose of this paper is to study mechanism design in the presence of
bounded rational players, we focus on social choice functions that are implementable in the
classical sense. That is, we only consider social choice functions that satisfy condition (i) in
Definition 1. There are several assumptions that could be made on f that guarantee that
the social choice function can be implemented. Here we do not assume any conditions in
particular but simply that f is implementable by some mechanism.
3 Results
Before we dwell into the characterization of k-robust social choice functions, the following re-
sult, which is a revelation principle type of result, allows us to focus only on direct mechanism
where players truthfully report their types.1
1Note that players truthfully reporting types simply means that s(θ) = θ, yet in general s(Bδ(θ)) = s(θ).
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Proposition 1. A social choice function f is k-robust with mechanism (M, g) if and only if
it is k-robust with mechanism (Θ, f).
Proof. If f is k-robust with mechanism (Θ, f) then it is trivially k-robust with some mecha-
nism (M, g), simply set (M, g) = (Θ, f).
To prove the other direction of the implication, first note that condition (i) of the definition
of k-robust is always satisfied by any social choice function that is implementable.2 Thus, we
are left to prove condition (ii) of the definition of k-robustness.
If f is k-robust with mechanism (M, g) then we have that for all θ ∈ Θ there exists a
c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
lθ
(
g(s∗(θ′)), f(θ)
)
< cδk
Given that f is k-robust with a mechanism (M, g), using condition (i) of the definition of
k-robustness it is true that for any θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) we have that g(s
∗(θ′)) = f(θ′) and, hence,
lθ
(
g(s∗(θ′)), f(θ)
)
= lθ
(
f(θ′), f(θ)
)
.
Therefore, combining the two expressions above:
lθ
(
f(θ′), f(θ)
)
< cδk
for all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ).
Thus, in the direct mechanism (Θ, f) where players truthfully report their types θ and
these are perturbed to θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) the loss is bounded by cδ
k.
A direct consequence of the revelation principle stated above is that when looking for a
characterization of k-robust social choice functions we can restrict our attention to the study
of truth-telling direct mechanisms.
Corollary 1. A social choice function f is k-robust if and only if and for all θ ∈ Θ there
exists a c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ),
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) < cδk.
Therefore, Corollary 1 implies that if a certain mechanism allows f to satisfy the definition
of k-robustness for a given k then the direct mechanism (Θ, f) also allows the loss to be
bounded by a factor of δk (with the same constant c). An implication of this is that the
2We assume that f is implementable, see the previous section.
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designer does not choose a difference mechanism than the one he would choose if he ignored
the limited rationality of players. This is an implication of the condition (i) in the definition of
k-robustness. Relaxing condition (i) in the definition of k-robustness could allow the designer
to choose mechanism that, although not being incentive compatible, may create a smaller
loss for some values of δ than an incentive compatible mechanism. We believe that incentive
compatibility must be a requirement on the social choice function because players may still
behave according to their true types (this is a possibility with the δ-perturbations), and as
such the mechanism must be able to implement the same alternatives it was first set out to
implement in the absence of bounded rationality.
Once we have established that the presence players’ limited rationality does not make the
designer to change the mechanism he chooses, a question that arises is that of the character-
ization of the loss induced by the δ-perturbations, i.e. the characterization of k-robust social
choice functions for all k. Our analysis continues by exploring this issue.
One might guess that k-robust social choice functions should exhibit some type of conti-
nuity, so that a perturbation of order δ is not translated into losses of an order much grater
than δ. This continuity is present in terms of Ho¨lder continuity, which is a generalization of
Lipschitz continuity:
Definition 2. A social choice function f is locally Ho¨lder continuous of degree k if for any
θ ∈ Θ there exists a c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) ≤ cd(θ′, θ)k.
We have the following result:
Proposition 2. A social choice function f is k-robust if and only if it is locally Ho¨lder
continuous of degree k.
Proof. Take any θ ∈ Θ. If f is k-robust then there exists a c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for
all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
lθ
(
f(θ′)), f(θ)
)
< cδk.
Assume that there exists a θ¯ ∈ Bδ(θ) such that
lθ(f(θ¯), f(θ)) > cd(θ¯, θ)
k.
Then, there exists a ε¯ > 0 such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯) if we define δ¯ = d(θ¯, θ) + ε we have
that δ¯ < δˆ and, since δ¯ > d(θ¯, θ), also that θ¯ ∈ Bδ¯(θ). Thus, because f is k-robust we obtain
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that
lθ
(
f(θ¯)), f(θ)
)
< cδ¯k
< c(d(θ¯, θ) + ε)k.
Since the inequality above is true for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯):
lθ
(
f(θ¯)), f(θ)
)
≤ cd(θ¯, θ)k,
which represents a contradiction. Therefore, it is true that for all θ ∈ Θ there exists a c > 0
and a δˆ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
lθ
(
f(θ′)), f(θ)
)
≤ cd(θ′, θ)k.
This is the definition of Ho¨lder continuity of degree k.
Assume now that f is locally Ho¨lder continuous of degree k. We have then that for any
θ ∈ Θ there exists a c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for any δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and any θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) ≤ cd(θ′, θ)k.
Since d(θ′, θ) < δ we have that
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) < cδk
as required.
Note that the definition of Ho¨lder continuity is made with respect to the metrics {lθ}θ∈Θ,
i.e. taking f to be a function between the two metric spaces (Θ, d) → (X, lθ) where θ ∈ Θ
is the true type of players. Thus, it could be that if, for instance, X = R, then f is locally
Ho¨lder continuous as a mapping (Θ, d) → (X, lθ) but not as a mapping (Θ, d) → (X,E)
where E is the euclidean distance. The metrics {lθ}θ∈Θ measure how far apart in terms
of loses for the designer two different alternatives are while the Euclidean distance measures
how far apart in space two different alternatives are. Thus, if alternatives are compared using
different metrics then the fact that f is Ho¨lder continuous with respect to one metric does
not imply that it is also Ho¨lder continuous with respect to another metric. This situation
arises in the example in Section 4.2.
Proposition 2 states a full characterization of social choice functions. For knowing whether
a social choice function is k-robust or not it is sufficient to study its degree of Ho¨lder continuity.
As we already mentioned, the fact that the notion of k-robustness is linked with a certain
type of continuity is not surprising, as by definition the concept of robustness incorporates
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the idea that small perturbations in the given parameters should not lead to big changes in
the alternatives selected by the social choice function.
Next, we focus on social choice functions for which the limited rationality of players
creates no loss (i.e. the set of ∞-robust social choice functions). Before we do that, however,
a new definition is in order:
Definition 3. A social choice function f is locally constant if for all θ there exists a δˆ > 0
such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) we have that lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) = 0.
Remark 1. A social choice function f is locally constant if and only if it is locally Ho¨lder
continuous of degree ∞.
A consequence of the remark above and Proposition 2 is the following result:
Corollary 2. A social choice function f is ∞-robust if and only if it is locally constant.
Locally constant social choice functions are frequent in the social choice and mechanism
design literature. As we shall see in Section 4.1, examples of locally constant social choice
functions appear in settings where there is an indivisible object to share amongst some
claimants (i.e. auctions, the Solomon’s Dilemma, etc.). These settings are characterized by
the fact that small perturbation in player’s types do not lead to changes in who the social
choice function allocates the object to. Corollary 2 implies that social choice functions in
these environments are ∞-robust.
3.1 Quasi-linear Utilitarian Environments
We continue the study of k-robust social choice functions by imposing some structure in the
environments we deal with. In particular, in this section we focus on quasi-linear utilitarian
environments: environments where the goal of the designer is to choose an allocation that
maximizes the the aggregate sum of the utility of all players, and where the utility of players
is linear in wealth. Specifically, we assume the following:
Assumption 1. Alternatives are of the form x = (x0, x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X = R
n+1 where x0
represents a certain choice of the designer and xi with i ∈ N are the transfers of each player.
Moreover,
ui(x, θi) = vi(x0, θi)−
n∑
j=1
ajxj
with vi : R×Θi → R and aj ∈ R for all i, j ∈ N .
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The next assumption specifies how the social choice function selects among different al-
ternatives and how the designer evaluates losses.
Assumption 2. Define e = (1, 0 . . . , 0). For all θ ∈ Θ and all x, y ∈ X:
- ef(θ) = argmaxx0∈R
∑n
i=1 vi(x0, θi),
- lθ(x, y) = |
∑n
i=1 vi(x0, θi)−
∑n
i=1 vi(y0, θi)|.
That is, the designer would like to choose x0 in order to maximize the sum of the utilities
of all players ignoring the transfers.3. On top of that, the loss function measures the welfare
difference between two alternatives, quantified as the difference in the sum of the utility of
x0 for each player.
We assume that in quasi-linear utilitarian environments the designer selects the optimal
x0 using a first order condition, i.e. ef maximizes the sum of utilities by differentiating and
setting the derivative equal to zero:4
Assumption 3. For all θ ∈ Θ,
∂
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂ef(θ)
= 0.
We also impose some structure on the utility functions and the social choice functions.
Firstly, we assume that for all players’ types θ ∈ Θ the term
∑n
i=1 vi coincides with its
analytic form (Taylor expansion) around ef(θ). In particular:
Assumption 4. For all θ ∈ Θ and all x0 ∈ R the term
∑n
i=1 vi is such that:
n∑
i=1
vi(x0, θi) =
∞∑
j=0
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
(x0 − ef(θ))
j
j!
,
where there exists an upper bound r > 0 such that
r > sup
θ∈Θ,j∈N+
∣∣∣∣∂
j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
1
j!
∣∣∣∣ .
Assumption 4 is satisfied if, for instance, the function
∑n
i=1 vi is a polynomial with finite
coefficients.
Finally, we assume that the choice of the designer, ef , is Lipschitz continuous:
3Transfers are only used to allow the mechanism employed by the designer to be incentive compatible. For
instance, in the public good example we present in Section 4.2 transfers are used to finance the public good.
4Implicit in this assumption is the fact that such partial derivative of
∑
i vi exists.
11
Assumption 5. There exists a k > 0 such that for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ we have that
∣∣ef(θ′)− ef(θ)∣∣ ≤ kd(θ′, θ).
As we shall see, the structure imposed by Assumptions 1-5 is in line with settings com-
monly found in the literature. An instance of these settings is presented is Section 4.2 where
we deal with the public good example found in Bergemann and Morris (2009).
Note that the fact that ef is Lipschitz continuous (Assumption 5) does not imply that f
is locally Ho¨lder continuous of degree 1. This is because of two reasons. First, Assumption
5 only deals with the first component of f . Second, the definition of Lipschitz continuity
is made with respect to the Euclidean distance while the definition of Ho¨lder continuity is
made with respect to the metrics {lθ}θ∈Θ. In loose terms, in our setting the Euclidean metric
measures how far apart in space two different alternatives are while the metrics {lθ}θ∈Θ
measure how far apart in terms of loses for the designer two different alternatives are. For
utilitarian environments, the only assumption we make about how the designer evaluates
loses is Assumption 2.
We have the following characterization:
Proposition 3. All social choice functions in quasi-linear utilitarian environments (Assump-
tions 1-5) are 2-robust.
Proof. We have that in a quasi-linear utilitarian environment for all θ′, θ ∈ Θ:
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
(
vi(ef(θ
′), θi)− vi(ef(θ), θi)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
j=0
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ)), θi)
∂jef(θ)
(ef(θ′)− ef(θ))j
j!
−
n∑
i=1
vi(ef(θ), θi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
j=1
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
(ef(θ′)− ef(θ))j
j!
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Combining the fact that
∂
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ),θi)
∂ef(θ) = 0 (Assumption 3) with the upper bound r
(Assumption 4) with gives:
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
j=2
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
(ef(θ′)− ef(θ))j
j!
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ r
∞∑
j=2
∣∣ef(θ′)− ef(θ)∣∣j .
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By Assumption 5 there exists a k > 0 such that for all θ ∈ Θ and all δ > 0 we have that
for all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
∣∣ef(θ′)− ef(θ)∣∣ ≤ kd(θ′, θ)
< kδ.
Choose some δˆ ∈ (0, 1
k
) such that (kδ)2 >
∑∞
j=3(kδ)
j for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) (for example,
δˆ < 12k ). We have that for all θ ∈ Θ and all θ
′ ∈ Bδ(θ) with δ ∈ (0, δˆ):
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) < r
∞∑
j=2
(kδ)j
< 2rk2δ2.
Therefore, f is 2-robust.
Proposition 3 shows that all social choice function in quasi-linear utilitarian environments
are 2-robust. The intuition for this result is that if the alternative to be implemented by the
social choice function is calculated with a first order condition, then infinitesimal changes in
the alternative chosen do not change the value of the objective function (derivative equals
zero). Hence, if the types of players are perturbed slightly and the alternative implemented
does not change much as a result (ef is Lipschitz continuous), the first order effect of this
perturbation (the term of order δ) is zero, and only the second order effect (the term of order
δ2) matters.
4 Illustration of Results
In this section we illustrate the applicability of our main results with two examples. The
first example deals with an auction setting where the designer wants to allocate an object
to the bidder that values it the most. This example shows an application of Corollary 2.
The second example illustrates an application of the result in Proposition 3 in a quasi-linear
utilitarian environment where the role of the designer is to choose how much of a public good
to provide.
4.1 Single Unit Auction
Consider an auction where two bidders N = {1, 2} compete for an indivisible good. The
set of alternatives is X = N × R where the alternative x = (i, p) represents the situation
where player i takes the item paying a price of p. The player who wins the auction on each
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allocation x is referred to as xW . Each bidder i ∈ {1, 2} values the object at θi ∈ R (where
R is endowed the euclidean distance) and has a utility is given by the valuation of the item
minus the price he pays in case he wins the auction. That is, ui(x, θi) = (θi − p)1xW=i.
The social choice function is given by f(θ) = (1, p) if θ1 > θ2 and f(θ) = (2, p) if θ2 > θ1
for any p ≤ max{θ1, θ2}. We are ignoring the case where θ1 = θ2 as in this case it is irrelevant
which bidder wins the auction. This social choice function is implementable by, for instance,
the second price auction.
The loss function is given by lθ(x, y) = h(|θ1− θ2|)1xW =yN where h : R+ → R+ is weakly
increasing with h(0) = 0. That is, if both x, y ∈ X prescribe the same winner of the auction
then the loss is zero, otherwise the loss is increasing in the differences in types.
Note that in the environment just defined the social choice function is locally constant.
Indeed, for all θ ∈ Θ if we set δˆ = |θ1−θ2|2 then for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and for all θ
′ ∈ Bδ(θ) we
have that θ1 − θ2 > 0 implies θ
′
1 − θ
′
2 > 0: if θ1 − θ2 > 0 then θ
′
1 − θ
′
2 > θ1 − δ − (θ2 +
δ) = |θ1 − θ2| − 2δ > 0. Similarly, θ1 − θ2 < 0 implies θ
′
1 − θ
′
2 < 0: if θ1 − θ2 < 0 then
θ′1 − θ
′
2 < θ1 + δ − (θ2 − δ) = −|θ1 − θ2| + 2δ < 0. Hence, the allocation when players
missreport their types to θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) is the same allocation as when they report their true
types. Thus, for all θ ∈ Θ and all δ ∈
(
0, |θ1−θ2|2
)
we have that lθ(f(θ), f(θ
′)) = 0 for all
θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ).
Remark 2. The social choice function f in the Single Unit Auction is locally constant and,
hence, by Corollary 2 it is ∞-robust.
In this example the fact that the optimal allocation is locally constant implies that slight
changes in the types of players will not change the identity of the bidder who values the
item the most amongst the two bidders. Hence, if the perturbations to players’ types are
insignificant enough, i.e. δ is small enough, then the second price auction still allocates the
item to the bidder that values the item the most.
4.2 Provision of a Public Good
Consider the public good example in Bergemann and Morris (2009) with no interdependent
utility functions.5 The set of players is N = {1, 2, 3} and the set of possible allocations in this
setting is given by X = R+×R
3 where if x = (x0, x1, x2, x3) then x0 units of the public good
are provided and the contribution of agent i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is given by xi. The cost of providing
an amount x0 of the public good is given by
1
2x
2
0. The objective of the designer is to choose
x = (x0, x1, x2, x3) such that the sum of the utility of all players is maximized. The player’s
5This means that the parameter γ in Bergemann and Morris (2009) is set to 0.
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types are given by Θ = ×3i=1Θi where for i = {1, 2} we have that Θi = R is endowed with
the Euclidean distance and Θ3 = {0}. Note that for any θ ∈ Θ, any δ > 0 and any θ
′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
it is true that θ′3 = θ3.
Player’s i ∈ {1, 2} utility function is given by
ui (x, θi) = θix0 − xi
and player’s 3 utility function is given by
u3 (x, θ3) = −
1
2
x20 + x1 + x2.
Note that player 3 simply represents the designer’s wealth.6 Using the notation from
Section 3.1 we have that vi (x, θi) = θix0 for i ∈ {1, 2} and v3 (x, θ3) = −
1
2x
2
0. Note that the
environment just defined satisfies Assumption 1.
The designer chooses
x0 = argmax
x0
θ1x0 + θ2x0 −
1
2
x20
and, hence, we have that x0 = θ1+θ2. As argued in Bergemann and Morris (2009) this amount
of public good is implementable by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves transfers given by xi = −
1
2θ
2
i
for i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, the social choice function is given by f(θ) = (θ1+θ2,
1
2θ
2
1,
1
2θ
2
2,
1
2θ
2
1+
1
2θ
2
2).
We assume that the designer evaluates loses according to the loss function lθ(x, y) =
|
∑n
i=1 vi(x0, θi)−
∑n
i=1 vi(y0, θi)) | =
∣∣(θ1 + θ2)x0 − 12x20 −
(
(θ1 + θ2)y0 −
1
2y
2
0
))
|. Therefore,
since x0 = ef(θ) maximizes
∑n
i=1 vi(x0, θi) = (θ1+ θ2)x0−
1
2x
2
0, the environment just defined
satisfies Assumption 2.
Under mechanism (Θ, f), if players report types θ then we have that x0 = ef(θ) and,
hence, we can write
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi) = (θ1+ θ2)ef(θ)−
1
2(ef(θ))
2. A consequence of this is
that
∂
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ),θi)
∂ef(θ) = 0. Thus, Assumption 3 is also satisfied.
Moreover, it is true that
∂2
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ),θi)
∂2ef(θ)
= −1 and
∂2
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ),θi)
∂jef(θ)
= 0 for all j ≥ 3.
Hence, for all θ′ ∈ Θ:
∞∑
j=0
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
|ef(θ′)− ef(θ)|j
j!
= (θ1 + θ2)ef(θ)−
1
2
(ef(θ))2 −
|ef(θ′)− ef(θ)|2
2
.
Since
∣∣ef(θ′)− ef(θ)∣∣ = ∣∣(θ′1 + θ′2)− (θ1 + θ2)∣∣ ,
6In Bergemann and Morris (2009) player 3 is not needed. We introduce player 3 so that we can apply our
main results in this example but player 3 plays no role in the strategic incentives of the other players nor in
those of the designer: player 3 does not affect the social choice function nor the transfers, and his reported
type has no effect on the alternative that is implemented.
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we have that
∞∑
j=0
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
|ef(θ′)− ef(θ)|j
j!
=
1
2
(θ1 + θ2)
2 −
|(θ′1 + θ
′
2)− (θ1 + θ2)|
2
2
= (θ1 + θ2)(θ
′
1 + θ
′
2)−
1
2
(θ′1 + θ
′
2)
2
=
n∑
i=1
vi(ef(θ
′), θi).
Therefore, Assumption 4 is satisfied. Finally, since for all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) we have that
|ef(θ′)− ef(θ)| ≤ |θ′1−θ1|+|θ
′
2−θ2| ≤ 2δ, the social choice function f is Lipschitz continuous.
Hence, Assumption 5 is also satisfied. This implies that Assumptions 1-5 are satisfied and
by Proposition 3 we have that f is 2-robust.
Remark 3. The environment just defined is quasi-linear utilitarian and, hence, by Proposi-
tion 3 the social choice function f is 2-robust.
Next we confirm this fact by explicitly calculating the loss when the players report a type
different than their true types. For all θ ∈ Θ if we fix any δˆ > 0 then for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all
θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) we have that
lθ(θ
′, θ) =
∣∣∣∣∣
3∑
i=1
v
(
ef(θ′), θi
)
−
3∑
i=1
vi (ef(θ), θi)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣(θ1 + θ2)(θ′1 + θ′2)− 12(θ′1 + θ′2)2 −
1
2
(θ1 + θ2)
2
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣(θ1 + θ2)(θ′1 + θ′2)− 12
[
(θ′1 + θ
′
2)
2 − (θ1 + θ2)
2
]
− (θ1 + θ2)
2
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣(θ1 + θ2)
[
(θ′1 + θ
′
2)− (θ1 + θ2)
]
−
1
2
[
(θ′1 + θ
′
2)− (θ1 + θ2)
] [
(θ′1 + θ
′
2) + (θ1 + θ2)
]∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
[
(θ′1 + θ
′
2)− (θ1 + θ2)
]2
=
1
2
[
(θ′1 − θ1) + (θ
′
2 − θ2)
]2
<
1
2
(2δ)2
< 2δ2
Thus, as already anticipated, f is 2-robust.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates bounded rationality in mechanism design problems. Bounded ratio-
nality is modeled borrowing from the ideas in the literature on robust control; we assume
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that for a given mechanism players behave as if their types were in a δ-neighborhood of their
true types. The designer acknowledges this fact and would like to know how the alternatives
chosen by each mechanism are affected by these δ-perturbations. To this end, he is endowed
with a loss function that evaluates the differences between any two alternatives given the true
types of players. We say that a social choice function is k-robust if the maximum loss when
players misreport their types is of order δk.
In our results we obtain three main conclusions. First, we find that a social choice function
is k-robust if and only if it is Ho¨lder continuous of degree k. Second, we find that the only
social choice functions that exhibit maximum robustness to perturbations are those that are
locally constant. Third, we find that all social choice functions in quasi-linear utilitarian
environments are 2-robust.
Our results offer new insights on how small perturbations may affect the alternatives
chosen by a given mechanism. We include two illustrations in the paper in order to highlight
the applicability of our results. To our knowledge, our paper is the first one to study robust
mechanism design using the tools of robust control.
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